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 1 
COHABITING WITH THE ACCUSED: THE 
FORMAL LIMITS OF SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE 
AFFIRMED IN VAN DER HEIJDEN v. 
NETHERLANDS 
Shae Fitzpatrick* 
Abstract: In the wake of Europe’s evolving social landscape of family life, 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) decision in Van der Hei-
jden v. Netherlands sheds light on the scope of spousal privilege. The 
ECtHR found that the Netherlands’ interference in Van der Heijden’s 
nontraditional family life did not violate her Article 8 right guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms . In its decision, the ECtHR upheld the formal limits of Dutch 
spousal privilege even though it did not protect Van der Heijden in her de 
facto relationship with the accused. Despite the contentious split on the 
court, the ECtHR reached the correct result and properly embraced fam-
ily form over function in this clash between criminal procedural law and 
informal Dutch family lifestyle. The ECtHR adopted a formalistic ap-
proach that departs from prior Article 8 case law, although, in this case it 
was justified because a criminal prosecution was at stake. This Comment 
asserts that the court’s reasoning was appropriate in light of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, the criminal context, and the letter and spirit of 
Article 8. 
Introduction 
 Ms. Gina Gerdina van der Heijden faced a profound moral di-
lemma when her companion of eighteen years and the father of her 
two children became a suspect in a fatal shooting: would she be obli-
gated to testify against him?1 Stakes are high in criminal cases, yet, vir-
tually every legal system, recognizing family as a protected social institu-
tion, exempts spouses from the duty to provide evidence and confront 
                                                                                                                      
* Shae Fitzpatrick is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 Van der Heijden v. Netherlands, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 
2012); id. ¶ 3 (Casadevall, J., dissenting), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ 
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001–110188 (decision not selected for publication in European 
Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions). 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:E.Supp. 
 
this dilemma.2 It was not that simple for Van der Heijden because her 
family relationship lacked one critical element required by the Nether-
lands courts and legislature—formal legal recognition.3 
 On April 3, 2012, the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) 
Grand Chamber addressed a conflict between criminal procedural law 
and the protection of family life in the case of Van der Heijden v. Nether-
lands.4 The ECtHR held that the Netherlands did not violate Van der 
Heijden’s Article 8 “right to respect for [her] private and family life” 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights or 
ECHR).5 Although Dutch courts sent Van der Heijden to jail for her 
refusal to testify against her companion, the ECtHR found that state 
interference in her private family life was justified in the truth-seeking 
pursuit of justice.6 This case highlights the significance of Article 8 as 
one of the most dynamic fields of ECtHR case law based on the evolv-
ing concept of family life across Europe.7 In light of the changing social 
landscape, this recent judgment calls into question the decision of the 
Strasbourg court in regard to Article 8 and spousal privilege.8 
 Part I of this Comment provides background on the facts of Van der 
Heijden and the circumstances of Van der Heijden’s family life with the 
alleged suspect, as well as the foundation of her legal proceedings in 
the Netherlands and ECtHR. Part II presents a discussion of the major-
ity and joint dissent opinions from the ECtHR’s contested 10–7 judg-
ment. This section examines prior Article 8 case law and margin of ap-
preciation doctrine development, in addition to the treatment of 
testimonial privilege across other Council of Europe Member States. 
Part III argues that the ECtHR properly applied a formalistic reasoning 
                                                                                                                      
2 Id. ¶ 32; id. ¶ 14 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (describing spousal privilege as the protec-
tion of family life as a social value and human right). 
3 See id. ¶¶ 62, 65 (majority opinion). 
4 See id. ¶¶ 62, 65, 84. 
5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, 
14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221[hereinafter ECHR]; see Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/ 
05, ¶¶ 3, 78. 
6 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 54. 
7 See Judy Walsh & Fergus Ryan, Irish Human Rights Comm’n, The Rights of De 
Facto Couples 47–48 (2006); W.M. Schrama, The Dutch Approach to Informal Lifestyles: Fam-
ily Function over Family Form?, 22 Int’l J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 311, 312–14 (2008) (discussing the 
growth of Dutch cohabitation as one example of the evolving concept of family life across 
Europe); see also cases cited infra note 74. 
8 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 14 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); see id. ¶¶ 5–6 
(Casadevall, J., dissenting); see also Schrama, supra note 7, at 311; Walsh & Ryan, supra 
note 7, at 43. 
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to reach its decision in light of the margin of appreciation, the criminal 
justice at stake, and the letter and spirit of Article 8. As a result, the EC-
tHR’s decision signals a reluctance to trump the Dutch legislative 
judgment and require the state to qualify Dutch criminal procedural 
law on the basis of an alternative family lifestyle. 
I. Background 
A. Van der Heijden’s Family Life 
 At the time of the suspect’s arrest, Van der Heijden had been co-
habitating with him in a stable relationship for eighteen years.9 The 
couple had two children, and Van der Heijden’s male companion had 
legally recognized both of their children.10 When Van der Heijden was 
detained, their youngest child was only two years old.11 Though Van der 
Heijden and her life partner had elected not to marry or enter into a 
registered partnership, they had maintained a long-term, de facto family 
relationship.12 The nature of their relationship was not uncommon; 
although statistics vary, Dutch society has experienced a steady increase 
and acceptance of cohabitation as an alternative family lifestyle.13 Addi-
tionally, cohabitation and marriage receive equal legal treatment in 
other areas of Netherlands law, such as taxation, alimony, tenancy, and 
social security.14 
B. Netherlands and the European Court on Human Rights 
 On May 25, 2004, Van der Heijden was summoned before a judge 
in a criminal investigation involving her longtime life partner.15 She 
appeared before the judge and refused to testify contending that the 
testimonial privilege afforded to spouses and registered partners under 
Article 217 § 3 of Wetboek van Strafvordering, the Netherlands Code of 
                                                                                                                      
9 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 13 (majority opinion). 
10 Id. ¶ 46. 
11 See id. ¶ 12 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. ¶¶ 13, 50–51 (majority opinion). 
13 See Schrama, supra note 7, at 312–14 (discussing growth in cohabitation rates in 
Dutch society); Wendy M. Schrama, Registered Partnership in the Netherlands, 13 Int’l J.L. 
Pol’y & Fam. 315, 324 (1999) (discussing the Dutch Registered Partnership Act enacted in 
1998 as an example of legislative action that created an alternative to married life, and its 
impact on the evolving social developments in Dutch society). 
14 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 48. 
15 Id. ¶ 13. 
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Criminal Procedure (CCP), should apply to her.16 Although her argu-
ment did not prevail, the judge declined to issue an order for her de-
tainment recognizing that her liberty interests outweighed the prosecu-
tion’s interests.17 The ‘s-Hertogenbosch Regional Court (Regional 
Court), however, rejected the judge’s decision and sent Van der Hei-
jden to prison for failure to comply with a judicial order.18 Following 
her thirteen-day imprisonment, Van der Heijden still refused to provide 
evidence against the father of her children.19 She appealed the judg-
ment, but the Court of Appeal dismissed her petition and upheld the 
Regional Court ruling that she was not entitled to testimonial immunity 
under Netherlands law.20 
 Van der Heijden appealed again, and in May 2005, the Hoge Raad, 
the Netherlands Supreme Court (Supreme Court), upheld the decision 
of the Regional Court, finding that the Article 217 privilege did not 
apply to Van der Heijden.21 Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected 
Van der Heijden’s claim that by denying her this privilege, the Nether-
lands had violated her rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.22 As 
noted by the ECtHR, the Supreme Court recognized that Article 217 
was intended to protect family relationships and that the principle of 
legal certainty supported this clearly defined statutory exemption.23 
 In November 2005, Van der Heijden began proceedings with the 
ECtHR, asserting that the Netherlands had interfered with her right to 
respect for her family life (Article 8) and, furthermore, that the state 
had subjected her to discriminatory treatment on the basis of her famil-
ial lifestyle (Article 14).24 The ECtHR reasoned that the Netherlands 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. 
17 Id. ¶ 13. 
18 Id. ¶ 14. 
19 Id. ¶¶ 17, 77. 
20 See Wetboek van Strafvordering (Code of Criminal Procedure) [Sv] Art. 217 (Neth.) available 
at http://wetten.overheid.nl/zoeken_op/BWBR0001903/TweedeBoek/TitelIII/ Vierdeaf-
deeling/Artikel217/geldigheidsdatum_26–10–2012 (select “laws”; type “Article 217” in 
“SKU” search field and select “article”; scroll down to Code of Criminal Procedure; check 
box next to “Article 217” and select “show item”); Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 17–
19. 
21 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 20. 
22 Id. ¶ 21. 
23 See id. 
24 Id. ¶¶ 1, 3; see ECHR, supra note 5, arts. 8, 14. The ECHR, formulated in the wake of 
World War II, discerns the critical need for individual safeguards against state action across 
Europe. Gillian Douglas, The Family and the State Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 2 Int’l J.L. & Fam. 76, 79 (1988). Following ECHR ratification, the Netherlands 
entitled all of its citizens to the protection of the rights provided in the treaty. See Nancy 
Johnson, The Breadth of Family Law Review Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 36 
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interference in Van der Heijden’s relationship was justified under 
Netherlands law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim.25 Consequently, this 
case turned on the question of whether the interference was 
“[n]ecessary in a democratic society.”26 The ECtHR found Van der Hei-
jden’s Article 8 right had not been violated and, as a result, declined to 
consider her Article 14 claim.27 
II. Discussion 
A. Majority Analysis 
 Van der Heijden v. Netherlands represented a clash between criminal 
procedural law and informal Dutch family lifestyle.28 The ECtHR 
framed its analysis with respect to Article 8 such that the Netherlands 
had a negative obligation to refrain from arbitrary interference with 
Van der Heijden’s protected family life.29 Based on established ECtHR 
case law, the court found that Article 8 protections extended to de facto 
familial relationships, such as Van der Heijden’s non-marital cohabita-
tion.30 Yet this protection—the right to respect for family life—was not 
                                                                                                                      
Harv. Int’l L.J. 513, 514 (1995). The ECHR established the ECtHR, a supranational 
court, to adjudicate the human rights claims from the treaty’s Contracting States. Id. at 
514–16. After exhausting the Dutch legal system, Van der Heijden filed an application with 
the ECtHR alleging that the Netherlands, as a Contracting State, breached its obligations 
under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. Id. 
25 See Wetboek van Strafvordering Art. 221 (stating that a witness shall be detained for 
failure to comply with a judicial order); Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 53–54. 
26 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 3, 55–57. 
27 See id. ¶¶ 3, 55–57, 78, 84. 
28 See Schrama, supra note 7, at 323–24 (citing the Supreme Court ruling in Van der 
Heijden’s Netherlands case). 
29 See Van der Heijden v. Netherlands, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 52–55 (outlining the 
relevant aspects of its Article 8 analysis); A.M. Connelly, Problems of Interpretation of Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 35 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 567, 570 (1986) (ex-
plaining the “negative obligation” approach that ECtHR often applies to Article 8 analy-
sis); Johnson, supra note 24, at 518. 
30 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 40, 50. The Government did not challenge 
the existence of Van der Heijden’s “family life” because it falls within well-established EC-
tHR case law. Id. ¶ 40. In addition, the nature of her relationship—length of time, and two 
children both legally recognized by their father—constitutes “family life” for the purposes 
of Article 8 protections. See id. ¶ 50. In Keegan v. Ireland, the ECtHR stated that the notion 
of “family” applies to non-marital relationships where the parties have cohabited together 
for a length of time. 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 342, 360 (1994); see also Kroon and Others v. Neth-
erlands, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 263, 283 (1995) (discussing that the notion of “family life” was 
not confined only to marriage-based relationships and might encompass other “family 
ties”). 
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absolute.31 The text of Article 8(2) provided an exception for public 
authorities, including states, to interfere with that right in limited cir-
cumstances.32 Accordingly, the ECtHR found the prosecution’s efforts 
to compel Van der Heijden to testify constituted an interference with 
her family life.33 This State intrusion, nevertheless, was executed “in 
accordance with the law” following the procedure set forth in the CCP 
Article 221.34 In addition to the statutory basis, the interference was 
justified in pursuit of the legitimate aim to prevent crime under Article 
8(2) and was necessary to achieve that public aim through state crimi-
nal prosecutions.35 
 The majority opinion focused its analysis on whether this interfer-
ence—Van der Heijden’s imprisonment—was necessary in a democ-
ratic society.36 In Van der Heijden, the ECtHR affirmed its role in Stras-
bourg as subsidiary to that of “national authorities” in the evaluation 
and protection of their citizens’ human rights.37 This component of the 
analysis aims to balance competing interests: protection of the private 
sphere of family life versus the public interest in prosecuting serious 
crimes.38 In an effort to strike the proper balance, the Netherlands gov-
ernment limited the Dutch spousal privilege to relationships defined by 
formal marriage or registered partnership.39 
 The “central question” that Van der Heijden presented was whether 
the bounds of this Dutch exemption violated Van der Heijden’s right to 
respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8.40 Aiming to protect fa-
milial harmony, the Dutch legislature, as noted by the ECtHR, enacted 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 56–57. 
32 ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8(2). Article 8(2) provides that: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a de-
mocratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Id. 
33 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 52, 53. 
34 Id. 
35 See ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8(2); Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 55, 57, 62. 
36 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 55–78. 
37 Id. ¶ 55; see Walsh & Ryan, supra note 7, at 42 (“Some deference is considered ap-
propriate because the ECtHR is not always as well placed as national actors in striking an 
appropriate balance between competing interests in complex areas of law and policy.”). 
38 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 56, 62. 
39 Id. ¶ 62. 
40 Id. ¶ 65. 
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Article 217 with objective formal limits to exempt “close relatives, 
spouses, former spouses, registered partners, and former registered 
partners of suspects” from their civil duty to provide evidence.41 The 
ECtHR did not question the authority of Netherlands legislature to de-
fine the limits of their spousal privilege, but Van der Heijden contested 
its scope.42 She asserted that her relationship with the suspect was func-
tionally equivalent to a formalized union.43 Therefore, the Netherlands 
courts in forcing her to testify implicated the same unfairness that the 
privilege was intended to prevent.44 
 Rejecting Van der Heijden’s argument, the ECtHR found the for-
mal legal recognition of the family unit determinative in her case.45 
The ECtHR focused this decision on the legal rights and obligations 
that accompany marriage or registered partnership to distinguish these 
formal relationships from Van der Heijden’s unrecognized cohabita-
tion.46 It was evident that the court did not want to engage in a case-by-
case basis assessment of family relationships because of the practical 
implications on judicial efficiency, time, and resources.47 Finally, the 
court returned to the fact that this was a choice made by Van der Hei-
jden and her counterpart not to avail themselves of a legal union.48 
Thus, Van der Heijden must face the legal ramifications of this volun-
tary decision.49 
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. ¶ 68; see id. ¶¶ 65, 69. 
42 Id. ¶ 69 (noting that states are entitled to set boundaries to the scope of testimonial 
privilege and to draw the line at marriage and registered partnerships); see id. ¶ 47; see also 
Thomas A. O’Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 4 Hum. Rts. Q. 474, 478 (1982)(discussing that states are 
entitled to make the initial determinations to conform their laws and practice with the 
ECHR that is subject to review by the ECtHR). 
43 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 65, 69. 
44 See id. ¶¶ 46–47, 65, 69 (discussing that spousal privilege shields certain witnesses 
from dilemma of providing truthful evidence that might harm family relationship or pro-
viding unreliable evidence at risk of perjury); id. ¶ 8 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (declaring 
that Van der Heijden faced the same moral dilemma as a married spouse or registered 
partner). 
45 See id. ¶ 69 (majority opinion). 
46 See id. (highlighting the legal rights rather than the characteristics of the relation-
ship such as the length of time or the supportive nature). 
47 See id. 
48 See id.. 
49 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 76. 
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B. Joint Dissent Analyses 
 The ECtHR’s decision was not unanimous; the court handed down 
a 10–7 judgment, including four separate opinions: majority, concur-
rence, and two separate joint dissents.50 This section explores the ma-
jority and dissents’ divergence in their treatment of Van der Heijden’s 
claim. In one of the dissenting opinions, Judge Tulkens, joined by four 
of his colleagues, challenged the overall framework of the majority’s 
Article 8 analysis.51 The majority framed Van der Heijden’s claim as a 
conflict between two interests, the protection of family life from state 
interference and the prosecution of crime, but Judge Tulkens in his 
dissent argued this ran counter to the “spirit and letter of Article 8.”52 
The ECHR and Article 8 guarantee rights, not merely interests.53 
Therefore, according to Judge Tulkens, the ECtHR should broadly 
construe Van der Heijden’s right to respect for family life.54 Conversely, 
Article 8(2) sets forth an exception to that right—public interest in 
crime prevention—that the court should narrowly interpret.55 
 Judge Tulkens’ dissent challenged the majority’s reliance on the 
principle of legal certainty to substantiate its rejection of a more nu-
anced analysis of Van der Heijden’s relationship.56 The majority rea-
soned that judicial efficiency and practical concerns weighed in favor of 
a bright line rule on family relationships.57 Yet the dissent explicated 
that in reality the applicant, rather than the court, would bear the bur-
den of proving the existence of a stable relationship.58 Analogizing to 
marriage or registered partnership, the dissent declared that much of 
the information pertinent to this inquiry was available in public or mu-
nicipal records.59 This dissent contested the majority’s swift dismissal of 
the equal legal treatment of unmarried persons in other areas of Dutch 
                                                                                                                      
50 See generally id. ¶ 84 (noting joint dissent opinions of Judge Tulkens, Vajić, Spiel-
mann, Zupančič and Laffranque as well as Judges Casadevall and López Guerra). 
51 Id. ¶ 6 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); id. ¶ 84 (majority opinion). 
52 Id. ¶¶ 5–6 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. ¶ 6; see ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8. 
54 Id. ¶ 6 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
55 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 6. 
56 See id. ¶ 10 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
57 See id. ¶ 69 (majority opinion). 
58 See id. ¶ 10 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
59 See id. 
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law and argued that the same principle should apply a fortiori even dur-
ing the course of criminal proceedings.60 
 In a separate dissent, Judge Casadevell and Judge Guerra found 
the limits of the Dutch testimonial privilege incompatible with the EC-
tHR’s concept of family life.61 The Netherlands devised a broad privi-
lege extending to “relatives in the ascending or descending line, 
whether connected by blood or by marriage . . . .”62 Nevertheless, Van 
der Heijden’s commensurate family life was denied statutory protection 
despite the fact that Van der Heijden faced the same unfair moral di-
lemma this evidentiary privilege was designed to prevent.63 Both dis-
sents contended that the majority’s formalistic reasoning conflicted 
with the Strasbourg court’s approach to family life questions as one of 
both fact and social reality.64 As such, the dissents advanced that pro-
tecting familial relationships trumps strictly adhering to the legal for-
malities delineating spousal privilege in the Netherlands.65 
C. Article 8 Jurisprudence and Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
 As the traditional concept of family life evolves across Europe, the 
fact that ECHR was intended to function as a dynamic living instru-
ment has made the margin of appreciation doctrine particularly rele-
vant to Article 8 case law.66 To achieve this aim, the ECHR must be con-
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. ¶ 10 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); see id. ¶ 74 (majority opinion) (finding that the 
equal legal treatment afforded to marriage-like relationships for purposes of taxation and 
social security was not relevant to this case). 
61 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05,. ¶ 4 (Casadevall, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. ¶ 8 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); id. ¶ 5 (Casadevall, J., dissenting). 
64 See id. ¶ 2 (Casadevall, J., dissenting); id. ¶¶ 7, 8 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
65 See id. ¶ 2 (Casadevall, J., dissenting); id. ¶¶ 7, 8 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
66 See D.J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 363 
(2d ed. 2009); see also Douglas, supra note 24, at 79.; Johnson, supra note 24, at 518–19. 
After the ECtHR obtains jurisdiction over a case, then its judgment is binding on the par-
ties involved. Johnson, supra note 24, at 515. As a result of this authority, the role of the 
ECtHR clashes with the international concept of sovereignty. Id. at 516. To remedy this 
fundamental tension, the ECtHR developed a judicial doctrine called the margin of ap-
preciation to afford a degree of deference to Member States’ governments. Id. The margin 
of appreciation has played a key role in Article 8 case law and, particularly, when the court 
affords states discretion in “sensitive areas” the ECtHR is hesitant to interfere with judg-
ment of national authorities. Harris, supra note 66, at 363; see Walsh & Ryan, supra note 
7, at 43; Douglas, supra note 24, at 78–79; Johnson, supra note 24, at 518–19. Since ECtHR 
precedents do not bind the Court, the effects of the ECHR can develop over time. Walsh 
& Ryan, supra note 7, at 43. Consequently, the ECtHR considers the changing legal land-
scape of the Council of Europe Contracting States and the presence or absence of com-
mon approaches on an issue. See id. 
10 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:E.Supp. 
 
strued in light of “present-day conditions” including social and political 
developments across Council of Europe Member States.67 In Stras-
bourg, the ECtHR functions as one tenet of the apparatus designed to 
uphold the individual rights and freedoms, including Article 8, guaran-
teed by the ECHR.68 Since that role is impacted by the federalist system 
in which it operates, the ECtHR developed the margin of appreciation 
to aid in the determination of whether a state law or practice violates 
the ECHR.69 Broadly, this doctrine refers to the latitude awarded to 
states in complying with the ECHR.70 
 In establishing the amount of latitude, or deference, to afford na-
tional authorities, the ECtHR examines the legal treatment across 
Member States to ascertain whether there is common ground on the 
issue.71 If no consensus exists, then the ECtHR affords the Member 
State a wider margin of appreciation in its laws or practices to protect 
the rights of the ECHR.72 Accordingly, this inquiry across Member 
States aids the ECtHR in performance of its function to maintain stan-
dards of human rights protections across Europe.73 
 In Article 8 jurisprudence, the ECtHR has interpreted the “right to 
respect for family life” broadly and utilized the margin of appreciation 
to extend Article 8 protections to nontraditional families.74 Van der Hei-
jden presented an opportunity for the ECtHR to address the scope of 
spousal privilege in regard to informal family forms.75 Yet contrary to 
prior Article 8 case law, the Strasbourg court focused on the lack of 
formal legal recognition for a family relationship.76 The court’s applica-
tion of broad, functional reasoning to Article 8 cases originated in 
                                                                                                                      
67 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 10 (1978); see Douglas, supra note 24, 
at 78 (noting that the ECHR must be dynamic in the sense that it is interpreted in light of 
developments in social and political attitudes). 
68 See O’Donnell, supra note 42, at 474–75. 
69 See id. at 475; see also Johnson, supra note 24, at 514. 
70 See O’Donnell, supra note 42, at 475. 
71 See id. at 475, 479–80 (discussing the consensus in law among Member States). 
72 See id. 
73 See ECHR, supra note 5, pmbl.; O’Donnell, supra note 42, at 474, 479–80. 
74 See, e.g., Kroon, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 283 (finding a child born of an extramarital rela-
tionship and his father amounts to family life for Article 8 purposes); Keegan 18 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. at 360–61 (finding a father and daughter relationship sufficient, though no longer 
married or living with child’s mother, for Article 8 purposes); Marckx v. Belgium, 2 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 330, 341–42 (1979) (finding Article 8 applies to a mother and her illegitimate 
child); Harris, supra note 66, at 361 (noting that the court has taken a flexible approach 
to the definition of individual interests protected by Article 8); Johnson, supra note 29, at 
518–20. 
75 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 65, 69. 
76 See id.; see also cases cited supra note 74. 
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Marckx v. Belgium, where the court held that Member States had a posi-
tive obligation to protect family life and, therefore, could not afford 
different rights of succession to legitimate and illegitimate children.77 
This 1979 decision set the tone for an expansive view of human rights 
with respect to Article 8 and illustrated the latitude of the State’s duty 
to respect family life under the ECHR.78 
 The ECtHR in Keegan v. Ireland affirmed that for purposes of an 
Article 8 right, de facto relationships may constitute family life even 
when the parents cohabitate outside of marriage.79 While the court in 
Keegan extended the notion of an Article 8 family to a couple that was 
no longer cohabitating or in a relationship, the ECtHR broadened that 
view in Kroon and Others v. Netherlands to a family dynamic that consisted 
solely of a parent-child relationship.80 The ECtHR in Kroon found a 
Dutch law that denied a father paternity rights violated his Article 8 
right.81 In that case, there was a nontraditional family relationship be-
cause the father’s son was born to his mother while she was still legally 
married yet legally separated from her prior husband.82 
 Similar to these prior Article 8 decisions, the ECtHR in Van der Hei-
jden found that the complex moral nature of the family life claim ne-
cessitated the use of the margin of appreciation.83 By relying on this 
doctrine, the ECtHR noted that the Article 8(2) standard of necessary 
in a democratic society might vary across states.84 Therefore, the court 
utilized the presence or absence of consensus on the scope of spousal 
privilege across Member States to determine the proper deference af-
                                                                                                                      
77 See Marckx, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 342; Harris, supra note 66, at 392; Johnson, supra 
note 24, at 518–19. 
78 See Marckx, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 330, 346 (stating that Article 8 must be interpreted in 
light of present-day conditions) (quoting Tyrer, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 10); Walsh & Ryan, 
supra note 7, at 48; Johnson, supra note 24, at 519. 
79 Keegan, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 360; see Walsh & Ryan, supra note 7, at 49. 
80 See Kroon, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 283; Keegan, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 360; Johnson, supra 
note 24, at 520. 
81 See Kroon, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 265–66, 285. 
82 See id. at 265–66, 285; Johnson, supra note 24, at 520–21. 
83 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 58, 60; cases cited supra note 74. 
84 See Johnson, supra note 24, at 516 (“[T]he Convention organs may most accurately 
be viewed not as a supranational court of appeal, but in their more limited supervisory 
role, slowly legitimizing European human rights consensus among the States Parties.”) 
(quoting Howard Charles Yourow, Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European 
Human Rights Jurisprudence, in 28 International Studies in Human Rights 1, 6 (1996)); 
see also Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 57. 
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forded to the Netherlands.85 The majority in Van der Heijden, relied on 
the lack of uniform treatment among Member States on spousal privi-
lege to substantiate its decision.86 The majority found that Member 
States employed a wide array of practices in compelling witnesses to 
testify.87 Furthermore, this absence of a common approach in conjunc-
tion with the sensitive moral nature of spousal privilege supported a 
wide margin of appreciation for the Netherlands.88 
 In contrast, the joint dissents offered a different assessment of the 
comparative survey.89 Judge Tulkens noted that although no true con-
sensus exists a majority of states would likely have de facto exempted Van 
der Heijden from testifying.90 As Judge Casadevell explained, thirty-
eight Member States granted a right of testimonial privilege and twenty-
two of those states would provide that right to Van der Heijden on the 
basis of her stable, marriage-like relationship.91 The divergent interpre-
tations of the comparative treatment of spousal privilege prompted the 
dissenting judges to question the court’s reliance on the margin of ap-
preciation doctrine and whether certain cases should be excluded from 
its reach.92 
                                                                                                                      
85 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 60–61. After all, the ECHR was designed to 
achieve “approximation of national laws but not their uniformity . . . .” See Kroon, 19 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 289 (Morenilla, J., dissenting); Johnson, supra note 24, at 522. 
86 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 31–36, 60–61, 65, 69. 
87 See id. ¶ 61. 
88 See id. ¶ 60–61 (“Although the lack of common ground is not in itself decisive, it 
militates in favour of a wide margin of appreciation in this matter.”). 
89 See id. ¶ 5 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); id. ¶ 7 (Casadevall, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. ¶ 5 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). The ECtHR considered a survey of the other Coun-
cil of Europe Member States on the spousal privilege issue. Id. ¶¶ 31–36 (majority opin-
ion). Non-marital cohabitants (like Van der Heijden and her companion) are fully exempt 
from the duty to testify in four States: Albania, Andorra, Lithuania, and Moldova. Van der 
Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 36. Beyond that, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland require evidence of a marriage-like relationship, such as 
children born, financial arrangements, or length of cohabitation. Id. Van der Heijden 
would likely satisfy that burden after eighteen years living together and two children with 
her partner. See id. ¶¶ 13, 36. 
91 Id. ¶ 7 (Casadevall, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. ¶ 5 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
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III. Analysis 
 The Van der Heijden v. Netherlands decision, at its essence, addresses 
the statutorily defined limits of the Dutch testimonial privilege.93 The 
ECtHR determined that competing policy interests in this case weigh 
more heavily in favor of the public interest in the prosecution of crime, 
rather than the protection of Van der Heijden’s family life from state 
interference.94 Despite the contentious split on the court, the ECtHR 
made the legally correct judgment in this clash between an emerging 
family dynamic and a criminal prosecution.95 In an attempt to balance 
individual and community interests, the ECtHR opted for a formalistic 
negative obligation approach that is appropriate in light of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, the criminal context, and the letter and spirit 
of Article 8 in the ECHR.96 Moreover, the result in this decision sug-
gests that the ECtHR is hesitant to require the Netherlands to qualify 
Dutch criminal law and extend an evidentiary privilege based on an 
evolving social landscape.97 
 Although Judge Tulkens’ joint dissent questioned the application 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine to Van der Heijden, the majority 
properly affords discretion to the national legislature based on the 
emergence of alternative family lifestyles across Europe, including the 
growth of Dutch unmarried cohabitation.98 This societal shift invited 
the Netherlands to take legislative action and provide nontraditional 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Van der Heijden v. Netherlands, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 65, 69 (majority opin-
ion). 
94 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 62. 
95 See id. ¶¶ 5–7 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); Keegan v. Ireland, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 342, 362 
(discussing the aim of Article 8 to ensure that a state achieves a fair balance between indi-
vidual and community interest); Marckx v. Belgium, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, 346; Schrama, 
supra note 7, at 323–24 (citing the Supreme Court ruling in Van der Heijden’s Nether-
lands case). 
96 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 65–69; see also Johnson, supra note 29, at 
517–18; Schrama, supra note 7, at 323–34. But see Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 7 
(Tulkens, J., dissenting) (challenging the formalistic approach of the majority and its disre-
gard for the substantive right of Article 8); Alexandra Timmer, Testimonial Privilege for Life 
Partners? The Formalism of van der Heijden v. Netherlands, Strasbourg Observers (Apr. 11, 
2012), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/04/11/testimonial-privilege-for-life-partners-
the-formalism-of-van-der-heijden-v-netherlands/ (arguing that the ECtHR’s departure from 
its flexible approach in favor of a more formalistic approach produced the wrong decision in 
Van der Heijden). 
97 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 76; see also Schrama, supra note 7, at 312–
14, 324. 
98 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 65, 69 (majority opinion); id. ¶ 5 
(Tulkens, J., dissenting); Schrama, supra note 7, at 312–14; Schrama, supra note 13, at 315. 
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families with the same legal protections.99 The court, however, invokes 
the margin of appreciation consistent with prior Article 8 jurispru-
dence and upheld the Dutch decision not to extend spousal privilege 
to de facto relationships.100 Even though the scope of the Netherlands’ 
privilege emanates from an approach that the ECtHR had previously 
rejected—formal requirements to recognize family life.101 
 In prior ECtHR decisions, the court disregarded formal legal cate-
gories and recognized Article 8 rights based on the realities of family 
life.102 In Van der Heijden, however, the court properly relied on Article 
217 of the Netherlands CCP to find Van der Heijden’s lack of a formal-
ized union with the suspect determinative in its decision.103 While the 
court found Van der Heijden’s family life sufficient for Article 8 protec-
tions, it was unwilling to challenge the objective statutory limits that 
govern spousal privilege.104 The Netherlands’ pursuit of justice in an 
ongoing criminal investigation reinforces the court’s adherence to the 
clear categories set forth in Article 217 and supports the departure 
from the court’s more flexible, functionalist approach to protect family 
relationships.105 
 The ECtHR champions the need for legal certainty and adopts a 
bright line rule because the prosecution of a serious crime is at risk. 106 
In order to reconcile this formalistic reasoning with prior Article 8 case 
law, it is crucial to take a more expansive view of what is at stake in this 
case—the broad administration of justice.107 Van der Heijden’s com-
                                                                                                                      
99 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 36 (citing examples of Council of Europe 
Member States that have taken legislative action); Schrama,  supra note 7, at 312–14; 
Schrama, supra note 13, at 316–17 (discussing recent social changes across Europe have 
prompted states to take legislative action similar to the Netherlands’ action to enact the 
Dutch Registered Partnership Act in 1998). 
100 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 61–62, 67–69; see cases cited supra note 74. 
101 Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 62, 65; see Keegan, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 362; 
Marckx, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 346; Harris, supra note 66, at 423; Schrama, supra note 7, at 
324. 
102 See cases cited supra note 74; see also Timmer, supra note 96. 
103 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 68, 69, 76–78 (majority opinion); 
Schrama, supra note 7, at 324; see also Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 2 (Casadevall, 
J., dissenting) (“The Court’s constant case-law has never required any formalities without 
which it would not be recognized.”). 
104 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 56, 69, 76 (stating that the state is per-
mitted to adopt legislation that it sees fit to balance competing policy interests). 
105 See id. ¶¶ 62, 68, 77 (noting the judicial interest in public prosecutions of crime); 
see also cases cited supra note 74. 
106 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 62, 65, 69–71. 
107 See id. ¶¶ 41, 62 (noting the Government’s argument that the civic duty to provide 
evidence was essential to judicial aims in Dutch society and explaining that the formal 
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panion was not simply involved in a minor criminal investigation, but 
rather he was a prime suspect in a deadly shooting.108 If the ECtHR ex-
tends the Dutch spousal privilege to Van der Heijden, then the state’s 
timely prosecutorial efforts in a criminal investigation might be jeop-
ardized.109 The joint dissents imply that the majority’s preference for 
legal certainty is motivated by convenience and pragmatism, but that 
view fails to account for what is at stake, both evidentially and judicially, 
in criminal proceedings.110 
 The ECtHR is not merely concerned with the practical effects of 
the burden to assess the nature of unregistered, unmarried relation-
ships on a case-by-case basis.111 In addition to the considerations of ju-
dicial efficiency, time, and resources, it is the broader judicial aims of 
procuring truthful evidence from reliable witnesses in order to prose-
cute crime that supports the court’s decision in Van der Heijden.112 If the 
court had adopted a functional approach to assess individual relation-
ships, then ECtHR might erect additional administrative hurdles to 
state prosecutions and impede justice.113 
 Furthermore, the Van der Heijden decision is proper by virtue of the 
letter and spirit of Article 8 of the ECHR.114 The text of Article 8(1) 
bolsters the court’s deference to the Netherlands because it guarantees 
                                                                                                                      
limits of the privilege support state efforts in criminal prosecution); cases cited supra note 
74. 
108 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 11, 77 (stating that the relevant criminal 
investigation in this case involved a criminal case involving murder). 
109 See id. ¶¶ 41, 62, 65, 69 (discussing the Netherlands’ argument regarding the 
broader aims of criminal justice that the court ultimately adopted and noting that securing 
evidence is crucial to the public interest in the prevention of crime). 
110 See id. ¶¶ 62, 69 (majority opinion) (discussing public interest in prosecution of 
crime); id. ¶¶ 9–10 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). 
111 See id. ¶¶ 41, 62, 69 (majority opinion); id. ¶ 9 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); Julia L. 
Cardozo, Note, Let My Love Open the Door: The Case for Extending Martial Privileges to Unmar-
ried Cohabitants, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 375, 405 (2010). 
112 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 62–65 (implying that the court has rec-
ognized an exception to the civic obligation to testify only when it absolutely necessary—
like privilege against self-incrimination); Schrama, supra note 7, at 324 (noting that the 
value of discovering the truth may trump other interests); Cardozo, supra note 111, at 405 
(discussing the considerations of judicial resources, time, and efficiency that affect a case-
by-case evaluation of relationships). 
113 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 65, 69 (noting timeliness, unreliable evi-
dence, and perjury as concerns that might arise if Van der Heijden were relieved of her 
duty to testify); Cardozo, supra note 111, at 405. 
114 See ECHR, supra note 5, pmbl., art. 8(2); Connelly, supra note 29, at 568; see also Van 
der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 76. 
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the right to respect for one’s private and family life.115 In addition, Arti-
cle 8(2) substantiates the court’s decision not to impose a positive obli-
gation on the Netherlands to extend its spousal privilege to de facto fam-
ily life.116 The explicit state interference exception for crime prevention 
in Article 8 denotes the weight of criminal prosecutions in striking the 
proper balance of interests.117 More broadly, the Netherlands is best 
suited to delineate what interference is necessary in Dutch society and 
realize the spirit of Article 8 to protect Van der Heijden from arbitrary 
interference.118 Notwithstanding the court’s willingness to intervene in 
other areas of law to protect the family unit, the ECtHR in Van der Hei-
jden is not prepared to require the expansion of the Wetboek van 
Strafvordering to protect a de facto relationship.119 
Conclusion 
 The Van der Heijden v. Netherlands decision augments the dynamic 
ECtHR Article 8 jurisprudence and sheds light on the scope of spousal 
privilege in the wake of Europe’s transformative shifts in family life. 
The ECtHR’s approach in Van der Heijden’s case demonstrates that 
the court will embrace legal form over family function in an Article 8 
claim that impacts the pursuit of justice. In light of the evolving social 
landscape of Europe, this nuanced legal and policy conflict between 
criminal procedural law and informal Dutch family life highlights the 
complexity of the Article 8 cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
                                                                                                                      
115 See ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8(1); Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 56–58, 71; 
Harris et al., supra note 66, at 422 (noting the language of Article inherently affords 
more latitude to state judgments). 
116See Connelly, supra note 29, at 572 (discussing the potential positive obligations on 
states under ECHR); see also Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 69. 
117 ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8(2); see Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶¶ 54, 62. 
118 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 56 (finding that it is the primary respon-
sibility of the Netherlands to determine the scope of this privilege); Kroon and Others v. 
Netherlands, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 263, 283 (stating that margin of appreciation is relevant for 
a state to achieve the broad aims of Article 8); Connelly, supra note 29, at 570; Johnson, 
supra note 24, at 517, 521. 
119 See Van der Heijden, App. No. 42857/05, ¶ 56; cases cited supra note 74. 
